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Administrative Structure Of Delhi Sultanate

Administrative Structure Of Delhi Sultanate

The Administrative Structure OF Delhi Sultanat drew heavily from the Abbasid model, alongside influences from the Ghaznavid, Seljukid, and Iranian systems. Indian traditions of monarchy, where the ruler was aided by a council of ministers, also shaped this system. Consequently, many administrative departments and offices retained older forms but acquired new names. However, the Turkish rulers introduced new institutions and concepts that enabled a degree of centralization previously unknown in India.

Note: This blog is prepared on the basis Satish Chandra’s Medieval India: From Sultanat to the Mughals Part One

Administrative Structure Of Delhi Sultanate

The Sultan: Powers and Limitations

The monarchy, although not originally an Islamic institution, evolved under Islamic rulers due to practical necessities. Early Islamic governance under the Caliphate emphasized simplicity and collective choice, but with the decline of the Abbasid Caliphate, the secular sultanate emerged. Over time, the Sultan became the pivot of governance, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the final court of appeal, and the social and political center.

The Sultan’s court became a hub for scholars, musicians, poets, and religious figures, increasing his prestige. Islamic, Iranian, and Indian traditions increasingly attributed divine qualities to the Sultan. Balban epitomized this tendency, assuming the title of Zill-Allah (Shadow of God) and introducing rituals like sijda (prostration) and pabos (kissing the feet), both traditionally reserved for Allah according to Islamic law (shara).

However, the Sultan’s power was not absolute. While many wielded tremendous personal authority, their power was conditioned by practical realities. Monarchs needed the support of influential groups—nobles, military leaders, religious authorities—and the passive consent of the broader population. Religion served as a primary moral check on despotism, prescribing ethical norms that rulers were expected to uphold. In extreme cases, a ruler could be deposed for gross violations, though such actions were rare and interpretations varied.

Unlike Western Europe, where a hereditary nobility often limited monarchic power, the Delhi Sultanat lacked a hereditary aristocracy. Positions of power, such as amirs (nobles), were granted by the Sultan and were neither permanent nor hereditary. The iqta system, adapted from the Seljukids, reinforced this arrangement. An iqta granted administrative and military rights over a region but not proprietary rights over land, and the Sultan could reassign or revoke these grants at will. This lack of hereditary nobility strengthened central authority but also introduced instability with each dynastic change, as former iqtadars often fell into poverty and obscurity.

Another institution reinforcing the Sultan’s authority was personal slavery. Slaves could rise to significant positions of power, being entirely dependent on the Sultan. However, the Chahalgani (the group of forty Turkish slave officers) eventually posed a challenge after Iltutmish’s death, and the political utility of slavery diminished over time. Firuz Tughlaq revived aspects of the system, but its political importance remained limited.

Two factors still constrained Sultanate authority: the uncertain principle of succession and the power struggles with the nobility. Succession practices in Islam allowed for nomination by a ruler but depended heavily on the support of the nobility and military strength. Primogeniture was not established, leading to frequent disputes and opportunities for military commanders or nobles to ascend the throne. Despite these tensions, the monarchy remained the central institution of governance.

Conflicts with the nobility, especially evident under Muhammad bin Tughlaq, were often due to specific policies rather than systemic instability. After Balban’s reign, the monarchy consolidated its authority further, establishing itself firmly as the cornerstone of Sultanate governance.


The Ministries and the Role of the Wazir

The Sultan was assisted by ministers overseeing various government departments. The number of ministries was not fixed and evolved based on the Sultan’s needs. Barani, through the voice of Bughra Khan, suggested reliance on multiple advisors rather than a single individual, though the wazir (chief minister) remained paramount. Ministers were individually appointed by the Sultan, held office at his pleasure, and did not form a council or exercise collective responsibility.

The Wazir, in theory, supervised the entire administration but was specifically responsible for financial management. According to Nizamul Mulk Tusi’s Siyasat Nama, a wazir should be an ahl-i-qalam (man of letters) rather than a soldier, marked by wisdom, experience, tact, and the ability to manage the nobility without alienating them. Powerful wazirs could also lead military campaigns, particularly during periods when the military character of the state was prominent.

Muslim political theory differentiated between two types of wazirs:

  • Wazir-i-Tafviz: A wazir with near-absolute powers except the right to appoint his successor.
  • Wazir-i-Tanfiz: A wazir limited to implementing the Sultan’s decisions.

Despite this distinction, real power varied according to the Sultan’s will. Sultans often sought strong wazirs who could manage daily administration yet avoided appointing wazirs who might overshadow them. Consequently, the 13th and early 14th centuries saw numerous experiments—sometimes the post of wazir remained vacant, or competing offices were created to limit the wazir’s influence.

Evolution of the Wazir’s Role

  • Under Iltutmish: Fakhruddin Isami, a seasoned administrator from Baghdad, served briefly, succeeded by Muhammad Junaidi (Nizamul Mulk), a powerful wazir whose opposition to Razia ultimately cost him his life.
  • After Razia: Muhazzab Ghanavi temporarily gained influence but was eclipsed when Balban rose to power.
  • Balban’s Era: As naib-us-sultanat (Deputy Sultan) before becoming ruler, Balban centralized authority, abolishing the naib post once he ascended the throne. He appointed Khawaja Hasan as wazir, a largely ceremonial figure, and empowered Ahmad Ayaz as Ariz-i-Mamalik (army head) to further sideline the wazir’s office.
  • Alauddin Khalji’s Rule: Jalaluddin Khalji appointed Khwaja Khatir as wazir, but he was soon replaced by Nusrat Khan, Alauddin’s brother and a notable general. Later, Malik Kafur, another military figure and court favorite, held the posts of wazir and naib-us-sultanat. Following Alauddin’s death, Malik Kafur attempted to control succession but was overthrown.
  • The Tughlaqs: Disillusioned by the power struggles linked to the naib post, Ghiyasuddin and Muhammad bin Tughlaq discontinued it. It was revived only under the later Saiyids as Wakil-us-sultanat.

Under the Tughlaqs, the institution of the wizarat reached its zenith:

  • Ghiyasuddin Tughlaq: Experimented with the office.
  • Muhammad bin Tughlaq: Appointed Ahmed Ayaz (Khan-i-Jahan), a rigid but competent administrator who served throughout his 28-year reign. Despite his competence, Khan-i-Jahan Ayaz failed to assert political dominance after Muhammad’s death.
  • Firuz Tughlaq: Appointed Khan-i-Jahan Maqbul, a converted Hindu, as wazir. This marked a significant shift in religious attitudes and administrative pragmatism. Khan-i-Jahan Maqbul managed the state effectively, although Firuz Tughlaq retained active oversight. Khan-i-Jahan Maqbul’s ability to navigate court politics allowed him to dominate administration without challenging the Sultan’s authority.

On Maqbul’s death in 1368-69, his son Jauna Khan succeeded him, but political instability following Firuz’s reign led to his downfall and execution. Modern historians like R.P. Tripathi reject the view that Jauna Khan harbored ambitions to seize the throne.

The Power and Wealth of the Wazir

The wazirs under the Tughlaqs commanded immense prestige and wealth:

  • Under Muhammad bin Tughlaq, grand nobles received salaries of several lakhs of tankas annually, with Khan-i-Jahan’s income equating the revenues of Iraq.
  • Under Firuz, Khan-i-Jahan Maqbul’s pay was 13 lakh tankas, with additional allowances for his sons and sons-in-law, enabling him to make annual gifts of 4 lakh tankas to the Sultan.

Internal Structure of the Wizarat

The diwan-i-wizarat (finance department) developed a more sophisticated internal structure over time:

  • The Mushrif supervised expenditure.
  • The Mustaufi managed revenue.
  • The Treasurer controlled the treasury.

These offices existed since Abbasid times and were continued by Iltutmish. A deputy wazir (naib-wazir) was appointed to assist the wazir. Balban’s creation of the separate post of Ariz-i-Mamalik (military affairs) reinforced the civilian character of the wazir’s office. Still, it was not until the Tughlaq period that the wazir emerged fully as the head of the civil administration.

Diwan-i-Arz

The Diwan-i-Arz was an important office in the Delhi Sultanate, primarily tasked with recruiting, equipping, and paying the army. The officer heading it, the Ariz-i-Mamalik, although highly influential and often a seasoned warrior and noble, was not the commander-in-chief — this position was retained by the Sultan himself. Nevertheless, the Ariz was entrusted with great responsibility and was expected to be a friend and guardian of the soldiers, treating them with personal care and attention.

The position of Ariz was not a Delhi Sultanate innovation. It had earlier existed under the Abbasids and was mentioned in the Siyasat Nama. It likely operated under Iltutmish, as noted by Barani, who mentioned that Ahmad Ayaz, the Ariz-i-Mamalik appointed by Balban, had held similar duties for thirty years under the Shamsi rulers. Balban greatly elevated the importance of this office, even declaring through Ahmad Ayaz that the Ariz was the main defender and assistant of the governmental system, surpassing the wazir in influence.

However, it was under Alauddin Khalji that the office was properly organized and systematized. Several important innovations were introduced:

  • The branding system (dagh) for horses ensured only high-quality mounts were accepted into the cavalry, which was the backbone of the Turkish military strength.
  • Control of the market ensured that good quality horses were made available at fixed, reasonable prices.
  • The descriptive roll (chehra) system was introduced for soldiers to prevent fraudulent enlistment, such as including servants and untrained persons to draw fake salaries.

These measures, especially the dagh and chehra systems, continued through the reign of Firuz Tughlaq, though not without issues. Firuz himself admitted that corruption persisted, noting that a soldier had to bribe a clerk with a gold coin to get a substandard horse accepted.

Before the strengthening of the Ariz’s office, military-related posts like the Mir-Hajib (superintendent of royal stables, held by Malik Yaqut during Razia’s reign) and the Darogha-i-Pil (keeper of the royal elephant stables) were considered significant. After the rise of the Ariz, these offices declined in relative importance.

Regarding recruitment and training, while detailed information is scarce, Ibn Battutah, who visited India during Muhammad bin Tughlaq’s reign, provides valuable insights. In Multan, a candidate wishing to join the army as an archer had to demonstrate his strength with bows of varying stiffness. A prospective trooper had to hit a target with a lance and pick up a ring from the ground while galloping. Mounted archers had to hit balls on the ground while riding fast. Such rigorous training exercises ensured that soldiers remained skilled after recruitment.

There existed a central standing army, to which the royal bodyguard belonged. However, the exact size of this force is not precisely known. It is mentioned that:

  • Alauddin Khalji’s army numbered about 300,000 soldiers.
  • Muhammad bin Tughlaq’s army was even larger.

These figures suggest that not all troops were stationed in Delhi. Instead, larger iqtadars (holders of land grants) maintained their own forces. Similarly, chiefs maintained personal armies, which could be called upon to join the Sultan’s forces during major campaigns. For example, when Balban marched to Bengal, Hindu chiefs from the east were instructed to join with their contingents, while Balban himself raised an additional 200,000 troops from the region.

With the Mongol control over West Asia, the Delhi Sultanate became increasingly isolated, forcing Turkish rulers to recruit more heavily from Indian Muslims and Afghans. Consequently, the army became a diverse mix of Turkish descendants, Afghans, Hindustani Muslims, and Hindu chiefs’ contingents.

Maintaining such a large army was financially burdensome. The state relied heavily on land revenue extraction from cultivators. Another method was plundering neighboring regions, often justified under the guise of “jihad” or holy war.

From Alauddin Khalji’s time, soldiers began to receive cash salaries rather than land assignments or other benefits. Alauddin set the salary for a soldier with one horse at 238 tankas — a relatively low wage even for that period. Details about salary rates under subsequent rulers are unclear. Nevertheless, the strength, discipline, and loyalty of the central army contributed immensely to the stability of the Delhi Sultanate.

The office of Ariz-i-Mamalik thus emerged as one of the most powerful offices, capable of checking the power of the wazir. This change meant that no wazir during the Sultanate period could convert military power into political dominance or install their nominee on the throne, a significant development that maintained the Sultan’s supremacy. Only in periods of administrative collapse, such as after the death of Firuz Shah Tughlaq and during the Timurid invasion, did the central authority weaken and infighting among nobles intensify.

Diwan-i-Insha

The Diwan-i-Insha was not a foreign office in the modern sense, as medieval inter-state relations lacked continuity. The wazir monitored foreign developments and kept the Sultan informed.

When major events like successions or victories occurred, formal epistles were drafted and dispatched by the Diwan-i-Insha. These letters were often grandly written with literary flourish. The department was headed by a dabir or dabir-i-khas, responsible for drafting communications to iqtadars and neighbouring rajas.

This was a key post due to the dabir’s proximity to the Sultan, potentially serving as a rival or check to the wazir. At times, the dabir-i-khas even rose to become wazir.


Diwan-i-Risalat

The Diwan-i-Risalat is counted among the four major ministries by Barani, but he did not detail its functions, leading to debate among historians. Interpretations vary:

  • Ministry of foreign affairs
  • Department for price control and public morals
  • Department for public grievances

The term risalat, derived from rasul (prophet), suggests an ecclesiastical character.

The key official, either the Sadr-i-Jahan or Wakil-i-Dar (Rasul-i-Dar), managed the granting of stipends and revenue-free lands (imlak) to Muslim scholars, divines, and recluses. Another important post was the Chief Qazi (Qazi-ul-Qazzat), heading the judiciary; often, both posts were combined.

The department also oversaw the appointment of muhtasibs (censors of public morals) who:

  • Checked gambling, prostitution, and other vices.
  • Enforced religious duties like namaz and roza.
  • Controlled weights, measures, and prices.

Under Alauddin Khalji, market controls led to the appointment of shuhnas under the diwan-i-risalat. However, after Alauddin’s death, the department’s prominence faded.

Firuz Tughlaq revived aspects of it. He:

  • Increased stipends and revenue-free lands.
  • Sought to abolish shara injunctions like bodily mutilations.
  • Set up a separate department of public grievances, also called Diwan-i-Risalat, under the wakil-i-dar. Even wazirs and princes could petition here.

Despite variations, the core function of dispensing stipends and land grants persisted throughout.

Diwan-i-Qaza (Judicial Affairs)

The Diwan-i-Qaza was the department responsible for judicial administration in the Delhi Sultanate. It was headed by the Qazi-i-Mamalik (Chief Justice of the Empire), who was often a highly respected scholar of Islamic law (Sharia). The main duty of the Diwan-i-Qaza was to ensure that justice was dispensed according to Islamic principles.

  • It supervised all civil and criminal cases, especially those involving Muslims.
  • Non-Muslims (Hindus and others) often had their own community leaders and local customs for civil cases, but criminal cases could still fall under Islamic law.
  • The Qazi’s court also handled issues like inheritance, marriage, divorce, and religious endowments (waqf).
  • Appeals could sometimes be made to the Sultan, but the Qazi-i-Mamalik usually enjoyed a high degree of independence.
    This department ensured that the Sultanate’s legal system maintained moral and religious standards, thus legitimizing the ruler’s authority in the eyes of the people.

Diwan-i-Wizarat (Finance)

The Diwan-i-Wizarat was the most important financial department of the Delhi Sultanate, and it was managed by the Wazir (Prime Minister or Chief Minister).

  • It was responsible for collecting revenue, managing the treasury, and maintaining records of income and expenditure.
  • The Wazir oversaw the collection of land revenue, which was the Sultanate’s primary source of income.
  • He managed the distribution of salaries to the army, nobles, and officials and also controlled state granaries during famines.
  • The department also supervised the minting of coins and ensured market regulations (especially during Alauddin Khalji’s reign).
    In essence, the Diwan-i-Wizarat kept the economic foundation of the Sultanate stable, and the Wazir was often considered second in importance only to the Sultan himself.

Diwan-i-Bandagan (Department of Slaves)

The Diwan-i-Bandagan was a special department that managed the state slaves (bandagan), who played a crucial role in administration and the military.

  • Slavery was an institution in the Sultanate, and many slaves rose to high administrative and military ranks.
  • The department kept a register of slaves, monitored their training, welfare, and discipline, and ensured their deployment in appropriate services.
  • Under rulers like Balban, who himself was a former slave, great emphasis was placed on the loyalty and training of these slaves.
  • Some slaves were trained to become trusted officers, bodyguards, administrators, and commanders.
    Thus, the Diwan-i-Bandagan helped create a loyal cadre of officials who owed their success directly to the Sultan, strengthening his control over the empire.

Diwan-i-Mustakhraj (Revenue Recovery Department)

The Diwan-i-Mustakhraj was specifically created to deal with the recovery of arrears of land revenue and other dues owed to the state.

  • Sometimes, due to calamities, poor administration, or defiance by local chiefs, the state faced difficulties in collecting full revenue.
  • The Diwan-i-Mustakhraj was tasked with tracking down defaulters and ensuring that the pending revenues were recovered.
  • It could take legal and coercive measures to recover dues, and in cases of persistent defaulters, land or property could be confiscated.
    This department was crucial to maintain the financial health of the empire, ensuring that revenue leakage was minimized and that funds continued to flow steadily into the state treasury.

Court and Royal Household Administration

In a polity centered around the Sultan, court and household organization was critical. However, unlike the Mughals, no single officer managed the entire apparatus.

The most crucial officer was the Wakil-i-Dar, overseeing:

  • The royal household.
  • Payment of salaries and allowances.
  • Departments like the royal kitchen, wine department, and royal stables.
  • The education of princes.

Given his access to all—courtiers, princes, queens—the post demanded high prestige and loyalty.

The Amir Hajib (or barbek) managed court ceremonies and maintained noble ranks and precedence. All petitions to the Sultan passed through him or his subordinates (hajibs). Due to its sensitivity, princes sometimes held this post.

The Barid-i-Khas, head of the intelligence department, supervised spies (barids) stationed throughout the empire, reporting critical information. Balban and Alauddin Khalji extensively used this system to control and demoralize the nobles.

Two other important departments were:

  • Karkhanas (Royal Stores): Responsible for storing and producing all articles needed by the royal family (e.g., food, clothes, tents). Each karkhana was supervised by a noble, with accountants and supervisors. Firuz Tughlaq especially developed the karkhanas, training slaves into skilled artisans.
  • Public Works Department (Diwan-i-Amirat): Developed during Alauddin’s reign but expanded massively by Firuz Tughlaq. He repaired buildings, dug canals, built new towns, and appointed Malik Ghazi (Mir-i-Imarat) to oversee it.

Provincial and Local Government

Initially, the Delhi Sultanat was a loose federation of military commands, focused on subduing Hindu chiefs and extracting revenues. Civil administration over all territories developed slowly, with the Khalji period marking a transitional phase.

Provincial heads were called walis or muqtis, in charge of iqtas or wilayats (akin to provinces). Their powers varied; for instance, the governor of Lakhnauti sometimes declared himself Sultan.

Under Balban, central control over muqtis increased. Muqtis were required to:

  • Maintain armies.
  • Cover their own and military expenses.
  • Send surplus revenue (fawazil) to the center.

By Alauddin Khalji’s time, muqtis were forced to implement central revenue assessment systems, similar to the khalisa lands (revenue sent directly to the treasury).

With greater central control:

  • Naib diwans (khwajas) were appointed from Delhi to oversee provincial revenue.
  • Barids (spies) monitored the muqti’s activities.
  • Muqtis retained military appointment powers and had a naib ariz at the center.

The judicial appointments remain unclear, but appeals against qazis and governors went directly to the Sultan. Muqtis could still grant revenue-free lands to scholars.

Under Muhammad bin Tughlaq, provinces expanded southward, and some governors were appointed under revenue-farming terms, prioritizing financial returns but weakening central control—a policy reversed by Firuz Tughlaq.

Barani noted 20 provinces before the conquest of the south. Compared to Akbar’s subahs, these provinces were smaller. For example, in modern U.P., the middle Doab was split into Meerut, Baran (Bulandshahr), and Koil (Aligarh).

Provinces in the Mughal sense began forming under Muhammad bin Tughlaq, and according to Shihabuddin al-Umar, he ruled over 24 provinces extending to Malabar.

Local subdivisions (districts or divisions) are less clear. Although shiqs and sarkars are mentioned in Afghan accounts, they may reflect later administrative divisions. However, parganas, sadis (groups of 100 villages), and chaurasis (groups of 84 villages) are referenced as administrative units.

Composition and Organization of Ruling Elites

The Nobility

In northern India during the 13th century, the most significant class to emerge was the ruling elite, consisting of the nobility. Within this class, a broad categorization existed: the Khans occupied the highest ranks, followed by the Maliks and then the Amirs. However, these distinctions were often ambiguous. Initially, Amirs included individuals holding junior court posts such as the sarjandar (commander of the Sultan’s personal forces), saqi-i-khas (in charge of water and beverages), sipahsalar, and sar-i-khail (junior military commanders). Over time, Amir came to denote any wealthy and influential figure within the government.

Nonetheless, it was the categories of Maliks and Khans that dominated the uppermost levels of government, with lists by Minhaj Siraj and Barani primarily mentioning Maliks. The use of the title Khan reflected Mongol influence, where the Qa-an (Khan) commanded 10,000 troops. In the Delhi Sultanate, “Khan” conferred prestige, such as in the case of Balban who was designated Ulugh Khan. Nobles were further honored with titles like Khwaja Jahan, Imad-ul-Mulk, and Nizam-ul-Mulk, and were awarded ceremonial privileges (maratib) such as robes, swords, flags, drums, horses, and elephants with elaborate trappings. These symbols not only conferred prestige but demonstrated proximity to the Sultan.

Number and Ethnic Composition of the Nobility

The exact number of nobles at any given time remains uncertain. Minhaj Siraj lists 32 Maliks during Iltutmish’s reign, including eight displaced Central Asian princes. Barani’s reference to the Turkan-i-Chahalgani (Corps of Forty Turks) likely alludes to the number of top nobles. Balban’s reign saw 36 Maliks excluding qazis, while under Alauddin Khalji, the number rose to 48, including seven of his relatives. These figures suggest that the upper nobility remained relatively small prior to the Sultanate’s expansion after Alauddin’s death.

Despite their small numbers, the nobles were intensely factionalized. Factors like ethnicity and personal alliances shaped these divisions. Turks regarded themselves superior to Tajiks, Khaljis, Afghans, and Hindustanis. After Iltutmish’s death, Turks expelled Tajiks and monopolized high offices. This Turkish monopoly was eventually broken with the ascendance of the Khaljis and Tughlaqs, under whom Indian Muslims advanced based on merit. Nonetheless, foreign ancestry and association with noble families remained socially prestigious, a fact confirmed by the Moorish traveler Ibn Battutah.

Social Origins and Mobility within the Nobility

Early on, there was significant social mobility among the nobles. Individuals from diverse backgrounds, especially those able to amass and maintain military followings (jamiat) or attract the Sultan’s favor, could ascend to the rank of Malik. Many started as slaves and rose through the ranks—a pattern enabled by frequent regime changes in the 13th century, which caused displacement of existing elites. Consequently, continuity within noble families across generations was rare during this period.

In contrast, the 14th century saw a stabilization of the nobility’s social character. The extended reigns of the Khaljis and Tughlaqs permitted the nobility to become more entrenched. The broadening of recruitment allowed more Khaljis, Afghans, and Hindustanis into the nobility without excluding the Turks. However, descendants of former nobles continued to carry the prestige and expectations of their forebears, confident of eventual restoration.

The ashraf (pl. of sharif), including clergy and aristocracy, formed the respected classes, for whom the state bore special responsibility. This included pensions to widows and financial support for the marriage of unmarried daughters.

Divisions within Muslim Society: Ashraf and Ajlaf

A broad social division existed between the ahl-i-saif (men of the sword) and the ahl-i-qalam (men of the pen), with the latter comprising clerks, judges, and ulema. Administration, fundamentally a military exercise for revenue collection, necessitated sidelining the literati, even though it was advised that the wazir should ideally come from this class. Alauddin Khalji notably scorned Qazi Mughis’s advice regarding Mongols, dismissing him as merely a nawisanda (clerk).

The emergence of the ashraf led to greater stratification within Muslim society. Opposed to the ashraf were the ajlaf or kam-asl—inferior classes comprising artisans, peasants, and laborers. Marriage or social interaction between ashraf and ajlaf was rare. Although Muslim societies in West and Central Asia had similar gradations, the arrival in India—a land deeply entrenched in hereditary caste divisions—made these distinctions sharper.

Thus, only persons from ‘respectable’ backgrounds were deemed eligible for high office. Resentment emerged when Muhammad bin Tughlaq promoted efficient individuals from so-called inferior classes (both Hindu and Muslim) such as wine-distillers, barbers, cooks, and shopkeepers. This policy failed, and Firuz Tughlaq reversed it by restoring the privileged classes to prominence. Acceptance was based more on perceived social status than ethnicity; for instance, Khan-i-Jahan, Firuz’s wazir and a converted Brahman, was widely respected, while Baraduis (low-caste converts) faced widespread disdain after Alauddin Khalji’s death.

During Balban’s era, nobles often lacked liquid wealth. For social functions, their agents borrowed heavily from Sahs and Multanis. All surplus from their iqta grants often went toward debt repayment, with merchants amassing the actual wealth.

This changed under Alauddin Khalji with the introduction of a centralized land revenue system, further strengthened by the Tughlaqs. Emphasis was placed on cash revenue collection, even from iqta territories. For instance, Ibn Battutah, when appointed judge, received his 5,000 dinar salary through assignment of 2½ villages yielding that income.

Consequently, noble salaries became substantial:

  • Maliks received 50,000–60,000 tankas,
  • Amirs received 30,000–40,000 tankas,
  • Sipahsalars were paid 20,000 tankas.

Under Firuz Tughlaq, salaries escalated:

  • Khan-i-Jahan Maqbul drew 13 lakh tankas, excluding army and household expenses.
  • Other nobles’ salaries ranged between four to eight lakh tankas annually.

These unprecedented salaries reflect a centralization of rural surplus and growing wealth concentration within the elite. Hoarding became more feasible: Malik Shahin left 50 lakh tankas upon death; Imad-ul-Mulk Bashir-i-Sultani, a former slave, amassed 13 crores tankas, out of which 9 crores were confiscated by the Sultan.

Although these instances might be exceptional, they point toward the emergence of a money economy, allowing slow but real monetization of rural wealth.

Trade and Investment by the Nobles

The growth of a money economy gradually changed attitudes toward trade. Ibn Battutah mentions that Muhammad bin Tughlaq owned ships and supported Shihabuddin Kazruni, a “king of merchants,” with three royal ships for overseas trade. Shihabuddin even managed Khambayat city for the Sultan and was reportedly promised the Wazir’s post before being assassinated.

Abul Hasan Ibadi of Iraq conducted overseas trade financed by the Sultan, purchasing goods and arms. While this indicates that some nobles engaged in trade, on balance, orchard cultivation and land investments remained their primary focus. Orchards multiplied under Firuz Tughlaq, suggesting increasing agricultural investment.

Nevertheless, substantial productive investment by the nobles had to await more centralized reforms under Akbar in the later period.

Education, Culture, and Patronage among the Nobles

While early Turkish nobles were not illiterate—since slaves were educated before resale in Samarqand and Bokhara—they lacked the cultural refinement of a long-established aristocracy. Their religious and cultural norms, imbibed from Central Asia and Khurasan, were more functional than sophisticated.

Over time, cultural patronage gained importance. By the late 13th century, figures like Amir Khusrau and Amir Hasan Sijzi catalyzed the development of an Indo-Muslim culture. Nobles and sufis began contributing actively. Zia Nakkshabi (d. 1350) produced works on diverse subjects and initiated translations of Sanskrit texts into Persian.

Thus, nobles evolved from rough warriors into patrons of culture, laying foundations for a rich Indo-Persian literary and artistic tradition.

The Chiefs—Emergence of “Zamindars”

Despite the erosion of Rajput political sovereignty across much of north India following the Turkish conquest, Rajput chiefs maintained their sway over vast tracts of the countryside, notably in Rajasthan, the Himalayan hill regions, Bundelkhand, and parts of Punjab, the Doab, Bihar, and Gujarat. Titles such as rai, rana, and rawat were commonly used to denote these local rulers, who possessed their own armed contingents and resided within rural fortresses. Though precise estimates of their numbers or military strength are absent, their significance in the political, social, and economic spheres of the rural world is beyond doubt.

Contemporary Muslim chroniclers often portrayed these Hindu chiefs as adversaries warranting a perpetual jihad. However, an enduring hostility was impractical. The Turkish rulers pragmatically allowed Hindu chiefs to govern their territories under the condition of paying regular tribute and demonstrating loyalty. This symbiotic relationship became more entrenched over time. For instance, Hindu rais from across a hundred kos would visit Sultan Balban’s court to witness its grandeur. After Balban’s triumph over Tughril in Bengal, he was greeted by the rais of Awadh. Similarly, Firuz Tughlaq’s invasion of Bengal saw the participation of Udai Singh, Rai of Gorakhpur and Champaran, who paid a substantial tribute of 20 lakh tankas.

When Malik Chhajju, Balban’s nephew and governor of Kara, rebelled against Jalaluddin Khalji, he was supported by the local Hindu chiefs, including rais, rawats, and payaks, who rallied around him in large numbers. Although Chhajju’s rebellion failed, the precedent of Hindu chiefs attending the Sultan’s court was set. Firuz Tughlaq notably allowed several Hindu dignitaries—such as Aniratthu (lord of two royal canopies), Rai Madar (or Ballar) Deva, Rai Sumer, and Rawat Adhiram—not only to attend his court but to sit in his presence.

Nonetheless, the chiefs’ position remained precarious. The sultans often sought to undermine their autonomy by imposing imperial revenue administration systems in their territories. Although this transition did not necessarily reduce the peasants’ burden, it curtailed the chiefs’ privileges and income.

By the early 14th century, references to zamindars increased. Amir Khusrau was among the first to popularize the term, which originally denoted hereditary rural intermediaries such as khuts, muqaddams, and chaudhris. Chiefs who were subjected to systematic land-revenue assessments were also categorized as zamindars. During the Mughal period, the term broadly encompassed all hereditary landholders and revenue claimants.

Although we know little about the zamindars’ lifestyle, sources consistently contrast their affluence with the general populace’s poverty.

Adjuncts to the Ruling Class: Judicial, Administrative, and Religious Functionaries

The nobility and ruling elite depended heavily on a range of subordinate functionaries, in addition to slaves, servants, and retainers. These auxiliaries fell into two main groups: judicial and religious officials, and administrative and revenue officers.

Judicial and Religious Officials

The qazis and muftis were the primary judicial authorities, appointed in cities with significant Muslim populations. They adjudicated civil disputes among Muslims based on Islamic law, leaving Hindus to their customary laws and the Dharmashastras, and administered criminal justice. The Chief Qazi oversaw this hierarchy. Special offices like the Dad Bak were created to regulate taxation and monitor the surveying of Muslim properties. The muhtasib, subordinate to the kotwal, enforced religious obligations such as observing roza and namaz, and checked public morality, including weights and measures.

All these posts were salaried. Their numbers expanded alongside the Muslim population. Other religious functionaries included imams, muazzins, Quran reciters attached to mausoleums, and teachers appointed to schools (maktabs) and colleges (madrasas). This group, known collectively as the ulema, commanded great social respect.

Generally, the ulema had formal education in Muslim law, logic, theology, and Arabic. Many were beneficiaries of state patronage via stipends and revenue-free land grants. Socially, they largely represented what would now be termed the lower-middle and middle classes, although some rose to positions of chief qazis or high religious scholars.

Criticism of the ulema was widespread among discerning contemporaries. Bughra Khan, son of Balban, cautioned his son Kaiqubad against the theologians, describing them as “greedy rogues” concerned more with worldly matters than spiritual ones. Amir Khusrau criticized the qazis for corruption, ignorance, vanity, and opportunism. Consequently, sultans restricted the ulema to judicial, educational, and religious duties, excluding them from political authority. Nevertheless, the ulema played a vital role in fostering Muslim social cohesion.

Many ulema were immigrants fleeing Mongol invasions or drawn by India’s prosperity. Their lack of deep understanding of Indian society sometimes deepened Hindu-Muslim tensions by emphasizing religious conflicts over existing social harmony.

Administrative Functionaries

Alauddin Khalji’s new revenue systems required an expanded bureaucracy in the capital, provinces, and districts. This led to a proliferation of clerks and revenue officials, including amils (revenue collectors) and muharrirs (accountants). Chroniclers like Barani graphically describe their corruption, abuses, and Alauddin’s harsh measures to curb them.

Although village-level officials like muqaddams and patwaris remained largely Hindu, most lower officials in urban centers were Muslims. However, under Muhammad bin Tughlaq, Hindus increasingly entered administrative services, some even rising to high office. Thus, a class of Persian-knowing Hindus emerged by the 14th century.

Standard of Living

Chroniclers dwell extensively on the extravagant lifestyles of the sultans—their opulent palaces, lavish wardrobes, enormous harems, splendid stables, and the costly gifts they showered on nobles, poets, scholars, and saints. This extravagance was deemed essential to project royal majesty and reinforce societal hierarchies.

Nobles’ affluence, noticeable from the Tughlaq period, manifested in similar ostentation. Balban’s cousin, Malik Kishli Khan, once distributed all his horses and 10,000 tankas among poets and minstrels. Delhi’s kotwal Fakhruddin under Balban financially supported 12,000 Quran readers and provided dowries for 1,000 poor girls annually. He reportedly never repeated a dress or bed. Balban’s diwan-i-arz, Imad-ul-Mulk, served 50–60 trays of food daily to his staff. Muhammad bin Tughlaq’s noble, Mir Maqbul, spent 3.5 lakh tankas on personal expenses, while Firuz Tughlaq’s wazir, Khan-i-Jahan, maintained a harem of 20,000 women.

This elite demand spurred specialized industries across India, although nobles typically refrained from investing their wealth in productive enterprises, except in garden-building under Muhammad Tughlaq and Firuz Tughlaq.

Life of Lower Elites

Junior bureaucrats, judicial functionaries, and religious scholars generally enjoyed comfortable, though not affluent, standards of living. Famous hakims (physicians) were often wealthy. Poets’ prosperity varied with the quality of patronage: Amir Khusrau’s father, for instance, received a stipend of 1,200 tankas annually from Balban. Ahmad Chap, Balban’s ariz (military secretary), once gifted 10,000 tankas, 100 horses, and 320 garments to royal musicians.

Thus, although not affluent, these groups lived in relative comfort.

The situation of the ordinary townspeople, however, remains obscure. Their standard of living likely remained modest, especially in comparison to the elites.

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