The Mughal Administration refers to the comprehensive system of governance developed and refined by the Mughal emperors between the 16th and 18th centuries, aimed at maintaining control over a vast, diverse, and multi-ethnic empire. The Mughal Empire, one of the most formidable and enduring empires in Indian history, was marked not only by its military conquests and cultural achievements but also by the evolution of a highly sophisticated administrative system. Spanning from the early 16th century to the 18th century, the Mughal state underwent significant administrative transformations under different emperors, each contributing uniquely to its structure and efficiency.
From Babur’s experimental fiscal assignments to Akbar’s institutionalized mansabdari and jagirdari systems, and from Shah Jahan’s refined bureaucratic centralization to Aurangzeb’s stricter Islamic legal and fiscal policies, the administrative machinery of the Mughals was both adaptive and strategic.
This dynamic system played a crucial role in maintaining the vast empire’s cohesion, extracting revenue, managing diverse populations, and asserting imperial authority across an expansive and multi-ethnic territory. The study of Mughal administration under various emperors thus offers deep insights into how governance, policy, and power evolved in response to shifting political, religious, and economic challenges.
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Babur
Zahir-ud-din Muhammad Babur, the founder of the Mughal Empire in India, reigned over northern India for a brief but impactful period of just over three years, from 1526 until his death in 1530. Despite the short span, Babur laid the foundational structures of what would become one of the most enduring empires in Indian history. After defeating Ibrahim Lodi at the First Battle of Panipat in 1526, Babur swiftly established control over Delhi and Agra, and followed it with successive military victories at Khanwa, Ghaghra, and Chanderi to consolidate his authority. During this period, Babur focused on stabilizing a turbulent political landscape, asserting centralized authority, and experimenting with revenue and administrative arrangements
Though his administrative system lacked the refinement seen under his successors, Babur’s reign was crucial in transitioning the fragmented post-Lodi polity into a centralized imperial framework. His efforts provided the political and administrative groundwork for his son Humayun and, more significantly, for Akbar to build a robust imperial system.
Mughal Administration Under Babur: The Wajhdari and Khalisa Systems
Under Babur, the fiscal and administrative organization was marked by transitional features that blended Timurid traditions with new mechanisms, which would later evolve into the Mughal mansabdari and jagirdari systems. One of the defining elements of Babur’s revenue administration was the wajhdari system, accompanied by the institution of khalisa — lands whose revenue was reserved for the imperial treasury.
Wajh and the Wajhdari System
Babur introduced the system of revenue assignments called wajh, a term with earlier roots in Indo-Islamic administrative vocabulary. Shams Siraj Afif mentions wajh in the Tarikh-i Firuzshahi, and it appears to have been equivalent to the iqta system under the Lodis. However, under Babur, wajh denoted something significantly different.
In contrast to iqta, which allowed sub-assignments, Babur’s wajh represented a fixed sum drawn from the revenue (jama) of a designated territory, not a land grant per se. The remaining revenue of that territory, after assigning the wajh, was classified as khalisa, i.e., revenue directly accruing to the imperial treasury. The nobles receiving these assignments were called wajhdars.
A wajhdar acted as both the fiscal and administrative in-charge of a territory but could claim only the fixed amount (wajh) assigned by the emperor. While this limited their entitlement, the absence of strict checks often allowed them opportunities for misappropriation. Occasionally, an entire pargana, with its full jama, could be assigned as a wajh to a noble. Interestingly, there were instances where the wajh assigned to a sub-region (like a pargana) exceeded that of the broader region, suggesting a flexible and status-based allocation mechanism.
Importantly, wajh assignments were personal and not sub-assignable. Only the emperor had the authority to assign territories or wajh to individuals, and wajhdars lacked the right to delegate or sub-grant lands.
There were also nobles who were granted wajh without being assigned any territory. These individuals were paid directly from the Imperial treasury, usually under the terms wajh-i istiqamat or wajh wa istiqamat. These terms — including wajh wa ulufa and wajh-i ulufa — appear to be interchangeable, indicating fixed salaries without administrative control over land.
An illustrative case is that of Alwar, where the same territory was offered with different wajh values to different nobles. Khusrau declined the post with wajh fixed at 50 lakhs; it was then offered to Tardika at 15 lakhs. This indicates that wajh was assigned according to the status of the noble, not in direct relation to the territory’s total revenue.
Thus, under Babur, wajh was essentially a cash salary, sometimes realized through revenue from assigned parganas or territories. Based on the nature of their assignment, wajhdars fell into three categories:
- Those assigned a territory along with administrative duties (e.g., Sirhind, Alwar, Tijara, Bayana, Qannauj).
- Those granted specific parganas in lieu of their wajh.
- Those not assigned land but paid from imperial funds.
The wajh was meant for both personal upkeep and maintenance of military retainers (naukaran, biradaran, and khweshan). Non-performance or failure to render service could lead to dismissal and confiscation of land or salary.
Another critical feature of Babur’s wajhdari system was non-transferability — wajhdars were not frequently transferred. Upon their death, their retinue and assignments reverted to the emperor, giving the monarch control over the military and administrative network.
Khalisa: Centralization of Revenue
Babur’s administration divided the empire’s revenue resources into two categories:
- Wajh — revenue assignments to nobles.
- Khalisa — revenue retained by the state.
Examples of khalisa lands include Bahlolpur (Trans-Sutluj) and Dholpur (near Agra). Cities like Lahore, Delhi, and Agra were also kept under khalisa. Administrative officials like diwan-i khalisa and shiqdar managed these areas. For instance, Abdul Aziz Mir Akhur served as darogha, and Khwaja Husain as diwan-i khalisat-i Lahore.
Babur’s Baburnama provides further insight. When establishing dak-chaukis between Agra and Kabul, the expense was to be met by nobles if the route passed through their territories, but if it passed through khalisa, the cost came from state revenue. This implies that khalisa lands were widely dispersed across the empire.
Initially, khalisa revenues accounted for 10–15% of total income, consistent with earlier Sultanate norms. However, in 1528, Babur significantly increased this share. He reduced the wajh grants of nobles by one-third, transferring the difference to khalisa. Based on an estimated total revenue of ₹52 crores, this reform raised the khalisa share to approximately ₹20 crores, or 38.6% — an unprecedented centralization.
Tuyul
- The term “tuyul” was used for revenue assignments, similar to the later jagirs.
- Tuyul were grants or assignments given to nobles or officials out of the state’s revenue for personal maintenance or for military contingents.
- They did not necessarily come with territorial control. That is, tuyul did not imply administrative jurisdiction over the area from which the revenue was drawn.
- This made tuyul different from the earlier iqta system of the Delhi Sultanate, where both revenue and administrative powers were transferred.
- Tuyul assignments could be either temporary or long-term and were subject to imperial revocation.
- In this system, the revenue rights were granted to the assignee (like a noble), but the area still remained under central or local imperial administrative control.
Paibaqi
- In the Mughal Empire, “paibaqi” referred to the lands whose revenue was reserved and not yet assigned to Mansabdars (officials). It essentially meant land revenue awaiting distribution or still under the direct control of the state.
- For example, if a territory had a total revenue (jama) of 10 lakh rupees, and 7 lakh was assigned as wajh or tuyul to nobles, the remaining 3 lakh would be counted as paye baqi, going into the imperial treasury.
- This balance was crucial for funding imperial expenses, especially:
- Court expenditure
- Salaries of central officers
- Infrastructure and welfare activities
- Military campaigns and logistics
Calculations based on Babur’s own records:
- 8–9 crores from peshkash (tribute)
- 5% (≈₹3 crores) from wajh-i ma’ash (charitable grants)
- 30% (≈₹12 crores) of nobles’ revenue shifted to khalisa in 1528
Total khalisa income = ₹8 + ₹3 + ₹12 = ₹23 crores
Later Mughals continued this trend. Under Akbar, khalisa revenue stood at around 25%, according to historian Irfan Habib.
The Ushr Controversy
In 1528–29, Babur also tried to augment state finances by imposing ushr (1/10th of produce) on madad-i ma’ash grants, which were traditionally revenue-free and given to ulama, Saiyids, and families of deceased soldiers. This sparked protests. A letter from Shaikh Abdul Quddus Gangohi rebuked Babur, calling the tax an unjust burden on the pious and poor. While early farmans of Babur prohibited tax collection from such grants, later he seems to have reversed this, aiming for further fiscal centralization.
Babur’s administrative units and fiscal policy — especially the innovative wajhdari and expansion of khalisa — show a clear attempt to centralize power and revenue collection. Though deeply rooted in older systems like iqta, these institutions laid the foundation for later Mughal policies under Akbar, particularly the evolution of the mansabdari and jagirdari systems.
Mughal Administration Under Akbar
Revenue Administration Under Akbar
The Mughal revenue system under Emperor Akbar represents one of the most significant achievements in medieval Indian administration. The principal sources for understanding this system are Abul Fazl’s Ain-i Akbari and Akbarnama, which provide crucial insights through several documents: (1) the Ain on Sher Shah’s rai, (2) the Ain-i Nauzdehsala, (3) the Ain-i Dahsala (1580), (4) Todar Mal’s report of the 27th regnal year (1582), and (5) Fathullah Shirazi’s report of the 30th regnal year (1585).
Akbar introduced standardization in revenue assessment across a large part of Northern India, from the Salt Range to the river Son, encompassing eight subas. The zabt system became the standard method—this involved assessing revenue by applying fixed cash rates (dastur) to the measured area under cultivation for each crop.
The Ain-i Nauzdehsala (Ain of 19 years) contains tables listing annual cash rates from the 6th to 24th regnal years. From the 6th to 9th years, uniform single cash rates were applied across provinces, suggesting assumed uniform productivity and prices. From the 10th year onward, the rates declined and began to vary, with high and low figures recorded, reflecting greater regional price differentiation. By the 15th to 24th regnal years, these rates declined further and varied significantly by province. The figures were given in dams with complex fractions in jitals (1 dam = 25 jitals), indicating detailed calculations.
The Ain-i Dahsala lists the current (c.1595) cash rates (dastur-ul-‘amal) across provinces. Instead of a uniform provincial rate, provinces were divided into dastur circles, each comprising a group of parganas, which had its own rate schedule. These often corresponded with sarkar boundaries but could also span across them.
Todar Mal’s revenue reforms, known as Todarmal’s bandobast, formed the foundation of Akbar’s system. It had three core features: (a) systematic survey and measurement of land, (b) classification of land by productivity, and (c) assessment of revenue.
Initially, Akbar followed Sher Shah Suri’s model, measuring cultivated land and assessing dues crop-wise based on productivity. According to Moreland, Akbar’s dasturs were intended to reflect one-third of the yield per bigha, commuted to cash using local prices. However, Irfan Habib and Shireen Moosvi note that there is no explicit statement by Abul Fazl to support this and argue that rural prices were at least 10% lower than urban prices. Thus, dasturs may have represented about half the actual produce, and Akbar’s state likely claimed 50%, not one-third, of the produce.
By the 10th regnal year, the uniform schedule was replaced with region-specific prices, reintroducing annual assessment. In 1573, annual assessments were discontinued and karoris (also called amils or amalguzars) were appointed to verify data on yield, cultivation, and prices. This led to the introduction of the Dahsala system in 1580.
The Dahsala system, developed under Todar Mal, refined the zabt method. It was based on data collected over the preceding ten years (1570–80) about yields, crop prices, and cultivated area. The average of this ten-year data was used to fix state demand in cash per bigha. Revenue was collected according to local productivity and prices, and each revenue circle had a separate schedule of cash rates. Though detailed, the system was neither permanent nor fixed for ten years—it remained subject to state modification. The system prevailed across the Indo-Gangetic plain from Lahore to Allahabad and extended to Malwa and Gujarat, and was later introduced in the Deccan by Murshid Quli Khan during Shah Jahan’s reign.
The system classified land into four types:
- Polaj: Annually cultivated land;
- Parauti: Temporarily fallow land;
- Chachar: Fallow for 3–4 years;
- Banjar: Fallow for 5+ years.
Polaj and parauti lands were further classified into good, middling, and bad, and their average productivity determined revenue. Chachar and banjar lands were taxed at concessional rates, which increased gradually to match polaj rates by the fifth to eighth year.
In addition to the zabt/dahsala, three other systems were used:
- Batai (ghalla-bakhshi or bhaoli): A traditional crop-sharing system where produce was divided into three parts—one went to the state. The peasant could pay in kind or cash, though the latter was preferred for cash crops.
- Kankut: A method where estimated yield was calculated by inspecting fields rather than actually dividing grain. One-third of this estimate was taken as the state’s share.
- Nasaq: Common in Bengal, this system relied on past revenue records. No measurement was made; instead, revenue was calculated based on previous receipts.
Though zabt was the most systematic method, others like batai, kankut, and nasaq were prevalent in different regions. Notably, while the assessment was individualized, collection relied on intermediaries—zamindars, talluqdars, muqaddams, and patils—highlighting a paradox in the Mughal fiscal structure.
The Dahsala System: Akbar’s Revenue Innovation
The Dahsala system, introduced in 1579 during the 24th regnal year of Akbar, was designed to rationalize and stabilize state revenue demand. It arose in the context of administrative difficulties, notably incomplete agricultural data and the rapid territorial expansion of the Mughal Empire. This system was based on a ten-year average of crop yields and prices in each locality and expressed the state demand as a cash rate, derived from actual local conditions.
Preliminary Reforms
Before enforcing Dahsala, two major preliminary steps were taken:
- Karori Experiment (1574): In Akbar’s 19th regnal year, revenue officers called karoris were appointed over lands yielding a crore of tankas (~₹2.5 lakh). Assisted by a treasurer and surveyor, they measured village lands to assess cultivation. Some accounts suggest they also surveyed banjar (uncultivated) lands, aiming to bring them under cultivation within three years—a largely unrealistic goal, resulting in many karoris being penalized for failure. This initiative led to the introduction of a new measuring instrument, the jarib (measuring rod), made of bamboo with iron rings, replacing the older hempen rope that expanded when wet and led to abuse.
- Khalisa Administration (1576): Areas from Lahore to Allahabad were brought under khalisa, or direct imperial rule. This was accompanied by the dagh (branding) system for horses, which created resentment among some nobles. The khalisa experiment aimed at first-hand experience of agrarian conditions, not abolition of the jagir system. Jagirs were eventually restored.
Features of the Dahsala System
By 1579, having gathered ten years of data on crops, prices, and land productivity, lands were grouped into assessment circles or dasturs. According to Abul Fazl, crop types, sown area, and produce prices of each pargana over the last decade were compiled, and one-tenth of the average was fixed as annual revenue. Unlike the earlier system where a single crop-rate was converted to cash, Dahsala used multiple cash-rates based on crop variety and area.
This allowed the state to estimate income post-sowing and land measurement (zabt). While beneficial for fiscal planning, it shifted cultivation risk to the peasant.
Key Clarification: The Dahsala system did not mean a fixed ten-year settlement; rather, it was based on average produce and price data over the preceding decade.
Price Calculation and Revenue Rates
Calculating average prices was complex. Modern scholars suggest they were not derived from prior cash-rate conversions but freshly calculated from past data. However, for cash crops like cotton, indigo, sugarcane, poppy, and oilseeds—whose prices fluctuated—revenue was fixed based on a favorable season.
Land Classification:
- Polaj: Regularly cultivated land; paid full rate.
- Parauti: Fallow for a year; paid full rate upon cultivation.
- Chachar: Fallow for 3–4 years; paid progressive rates, full by third year.
- Banjar: Wasteland; paid full rate only in the fifth year to encourage cultivation.
Produce Classification: Land was classified as good, bad, or middling. Normally, the state took one-third of the produce. In regions like Multan and Rajasthan, it was one-fourth; in saffron-growing Kashmir, it was one-half.
While the Dahsala rate covered state demand, peasants also bore numerous other burdens—cesses on cattle, trees, etc., shares for zamindars and village officials, and costs for village maintenance. Still, land revenue remained the heaviest burden, enforced under threat of eviction or worse.
Implementation and Variants
The Dahsala system, based on zabt (measurement), was extended from Lahore to Allahabad, and to Gujarat, Malwa, Bihar, and parts of Multan. However, historian Irfan Habib argues it did not uniformly cover entire provinces. The Ain-i-Akbari notes that amalguzars (revenue collectors) were to use any assessment method preferred by the cultivator.
Other Methods:
- Kankut (Appraisement): Fields measured and standing crops inspected or divided into good, middling, and poor for yield estimation.
- Batai (Crop-sharing): Of three types:
- Bhaoli: Harvest stacked and divided by agreement.
- Khet Batai: Fields divided after sowing.
- Lang Batai: Harvest formed in heaps and divided.
These required competent inspectors to prevent fraud.
- Kashmir: Used kharwar (ass-loads) for estimating produce before sharing.
- Nasaq: Controversial in definition. Moreland called it group-assessment; R.P. Tripathi disagreed. Habib suggests it was estimation based on previous assessments. It allowed peasants to avoid fresh assessments unless they contested the previous one. Nasaq based on zabt likely became standard, though batai remained an option, especially in bad crop years.
Payment Modalities
Though the state preferred cash, peasants could pay in kind. Often, winter crops were paid in cash and summer ones in kind. When paid in kind, produce was sold and converted to cash, as seen in 17th-century Rajasthan records. Thus, the system had a practical flexibility not fully captured in official documents.
Individual vs Group Assessment
There is debate whether revenue was assessed on individuals or villages. Akbar’s policy avoided group assessment as it could allow wealthy cultivators to shift their burden onto the poor. This wasn’t egalitarian but a way to uncover a village’s real productive capacity. Hence, emphasis was on assessing each cultivator individually.
However, zamindars (local chiefs) still wielded considerable power, particularly in rugged terrains. They were allowed traditional dues and a share in land revenue collection. Akbar succeeded in gaining their cooperation—especially through qanungos—in regions from Lahore to Allahabad. Collection was done by village headmen or zamindars, though they could manipulate records.
Patta (title deed) and Qabuliat (acceptance letter) outlined crop details, sown area, and dues. Though peasants were mostly illiterate, these documents allowed state oversight over collections.
Permanence and Revisions
The Dahsala assessment, while not officially permanent, was practically so—no major reassessment occurred during Akbar’s later reign or his successors’. Still, the state benefited from agricultural expansion. Banjar lands received concessional rates for initial years. The amalguzar was tasked with preventing land from going fallow, granting land in other villages to willing cultivators, and disbursing agricultural loans (taqavi) for seeds, tools, or irrigation during droughts.
Superior crop cultivation was also encouraged with concessions. Price fluctuations affected revenue: in 1598, due to a price rise in Lahore, demand increased by 20%; this was rolled back after Akbar left. Conversely, in 1585–86, price falls led to revenue cuts in Delhi, Allahabad, and Awadh. In drought years, part of the land was declared nabud (not sown) to enable remission.
Challenges and Reforms
Despite mechanisms for relief, the system remained rigid. Tardy and inadequate remissions, combined with high demands, caused revenue arrears. Under Todar Mal, harsh recovery efforts were made, often targeting amils (revenue officials), who in turn oppressed peasants.
Akbar appointed a Commission in 1585 to investigate. It revealed several abuses: inflated arrears based on estimated rather than actual sown areas; assessments on abandoned lands; arbitrary arrests of amils; withheld salaries; and unauthorized deductions. The Commission recommended reforms: regulating charges for measuring staff and punishing corrupt amils.
Final Reforms
A new yardstick, the gaz-i-Ilahi (33 inches), replaced the gaz-i-Sikandari, making the unit of measurement 14% longer. Consequently, the bigha expanded by 10.5%, necessitating revision of dastur rates for kharif and rabi crops.
Reorganization of Government under Akbar
Akbar inherited the foundational governmental structure of the Delhi Sultanate. Babur and Humayun, preoccupied with conquests and internal instability, made little contribution to revising or restructuring the administrative system. Sher Shah Suri, however, introduced several vital changes, especially in the revenue and administrative domains. When Akbar firmly took control of the empire after subduing the rebellious Uzbek nobles and consolidating power through his victory in Gujarat, he turned his attention toward systematising and reorganising the imperial administration.
Akbar’s administrative structure had innovative and practical features. Each department had clearly defined roles and functions, ensuring efficiency and preventing overlapping jurisdictions. The emphasis was on checks and balances, a critical element that sustained the system’s integrity. His administrative reforms were not merely cosmetic; they breathed new life into the imperial structure.
At the district (sarkar) and sub-district (pargana) levels, Akbar retained the basic framework established by his predecessors. However, he introduced some changes in nomenclature and in the designation of officials. More significantly, he developed a well-structured provincial administration, which mirrored the central government. This system was guided by detailed rules and regulations, with some documented in Abul Fazl’s Ain-i-Akbari, and others compiled later in Dastur-ul-Amals (Rule Books). This gave rise to a professional, bureaucratic system of administration, though the emperor remained the supreme authority and focal point of the system.
The Office of the Vakil: Evolution and Decline
The Vakil, an official inherited from earlier Islamic and Timurid traditions, originally wielded immense power, often combining responsibilities of both political and military affairs. In Babur’s reign, Nizammuddin Khwaja held this powerful position, acting as both political and military head. Similarly, Humayun’s wazirs—Amir Wais and Hindu Beg—were influential and often commanded troops in battle.
However, the post reached its zenith with Bairam Khan, who was not only the Vakil but also Akbar’s guardian (atalik). He directed imperial policy, appointed officials, and controlled revenue and military affairs. This absolute concentration of power in a single officeholder was deemed problematic by Akbar, particularly as some of Bairam Khan’s successors, like Maham Anaga, tried to retain such dominance through factional politics.
The execution of Adham Khan, who murdered Atka Khan, served as a warning against the misuse of authority. Akbar was determined to prevent the recurrence of factionalism and dominance by a single figure. Consequently, when Munim Khan was appointed Vakil, he was not granted overarching powers. In 1564–65, Akbar appointed Muzaffar Khan Turbati, a former Diwan under Bairam Khan, to oversee revenue administration, with Raja Todar Mal as his assistant. Over time, revenue and financial responsibilities were entirely detached from the Vakil’s office.
After the suppression of the Uzbek rebellion in 1567, Munim Khan was shifted to provincial duties and no longer played a role in central administration. The post of Vakil remained vacant for seven years. It was briefly revived in 1575, when Muzaffar Khan was appointed again, combining the posts of Diwan and Vakil. Despite this dual role, he was more a financial expert than a powerful minister, as reflected in his relatively low mansab rank of 4000. He worked under the supervision of joint-Diwans Todar Mal and Shah Mansur. However, by 1579, Muzaffar Khan was reassigned to Bengal, ending his role in central administration.
Between 1579 and 1589, no Vakil was appointed—a clear indication that the position was a symbolic favor from Akbar rather than an essential office of governance. Later, Mirza Aziz Koka, Akbar’s childhood friend, was appointed Vakil in 1595. Despite his personal closeness to Akbar, he exercised no real administrative authority. His appointment, like Munim Khan’s, was ceremonial, intended more for honour and prestige than policy-making. As Ibn Hasan noted, the Vakil’s power was stripped, though the outward show and prestige of the office remained.
Organisation of Ministries
Akbar’s next significant administrative step was the reorganisation of the four major ministries, which included:
- Revenue Department (Diwan or Wazir)
- Military Department (Mir Bakshi)
- Imperial Establishments and Royal Household (Mir Saman)
- Judicial and Inam Grants Department (Sadr)
This four-fold division reflected Islamic administrative traditions, notably advocated by Ibn Khaldun. However, not all departments held equal importance. Over time, the Diwan’s office emerged as the most influential, closely followed by the Mir Bakshi.
The Diwan: Revenue and Financial Administration
According to Abul Fazl, the Diwan or Diwan-i-Ala was essentially the financial head of the empire, responsible for revenue collection, expenditure control, auditing, and maintaining fiscal discipline. While Abul Fazl attempted to downplay his political role, calling him merely a “book keeper,” the Diwan exercised significant control over government accounts, treasury, and financial planning. Under him worked the Mustaufi (Auditor of Accounts), and accountants of various departments, including the army, household, karkhanas, and provincial diwans.
Diwans were typically drawn from the Ahl-i-Qalam (writer) class, distinguishing them from warriors. Still, this was not a rigid division; some, like Muzaffar Khan and Todar Mal, were also engaged in military assignments.
The revenue department truly began to flourish under Muzaffar Khan Turbati, appointed Diwan in 1565. A former Vakil under Bairam Khan, he was imprisoned but later released and entrusted with important assignments by Akbar due to his financial acumen. Initially posted as amil of Pasrur and later as Diwan of Imperial karkhanas, Muzaffar Khan rose in prominence and was soon entrusted with high-level appointments and policy advice. During his tenure as Diwan (1563–72), he initiated several important financial reforms.
However, his arrogance and abrasive behavior—notably insulting the emperor during a chaupar game—led to his temporary exile to Mecca. Though later recalled and made Vakil, he was ultimately dismissed for opposing key military and financial reforms. Despite his fall, he left behind a legacy of robust administrative practices and trained capable deputies, like Raja Todar Mal and Shah Mansur, who implemented Akbar’s Dahsala system (Ten-Yearly Settlement).
Todar Mal and Shah Mansur: Implementing the Dahsala System
Raja Todar Mal, a brilliant official who had earlier built Rohtas Fort for Sher Shah, gained a reputation as a competent administrator. While his precise role in Sher Shah’s revenue reforms is unclear, he became a significant figure in Akbar’s administration. After serving as Diwan of Gujarat (1573), he was brought into the central revenue department and appointed Mushrif-i-Diwan (1575). Abul Fazl describes this post as senior to a Diwan but junior to the Vakil.
Together with Shah Mansur, Todar Mal divided the empire into twelve provinces, each with a governor and a provincial Diwan. Though the Dahsala system was prepared earlier, it was Shah Mansur who first implemented it while Todar Mal was posted in Bengal. Mansur’s rigid enforcement of reforms like Dagh-o-Mahalli (branding of horses) in Bengal and Bihar earned him enemies. He was later accused of conspiring with Mirza Hakim (Akbar’s step-brother), possibly falsely, and was executed in 1581—reportedly due to forged letters fabricated by Todar Mal.
Whether Akbar was aware of Todar Mal’s involvement or chose to ignore it, Todar Mal was soon promoted as Diwan-i-Ala. From 1581 until his death, he became the most influential figure in financial matters. He is popularly associated with the Dahsala system, which standardised revenue assessments over ten years, creating a stable and fair taxation structure across the empire.
Provincial Government under Akbar
The system of provincial administration under Akbar was a significant departure from the earlier Delhi Sultanate, where no clear provincial boundaries existed. Under the Sultans, muqtis—holders of iqtas—held combined executive and military powers. They collected land revenue, maintained law and order, and secured royal pathways. Larger and strategically important iqtas were under walis or amirs, but the true administrative unit was the sarkar.
Akbar’s Initial Approach (till 1580):
Initially, Akbar continued the Sultanate structure, but by 1580, after his conquests of Gujarat, Bihar, and Bengal, he reorganized the empire into twelve subahs (provinces). Each subah was headed by a subahdar (initially called sipahsalar), who was supported by several centrally appointed officials:
- Diwan (revenue and finance)
- Bakhshi (military and intelligence)
- Sadr-cum-Qazi (religious and judicial officer)
- Mir Adl (judge)
- Kotwal (city administration and policing)
- Mir Bahr (ports and river administration)
- Waqia-navis (news writer)
Each of these officers was accountable to their respective central ministries and not directly to the subahdar, thereby ensuring a system of checks and balances within the provincial structure.
Territorial Organization:
The Ain-i-Akbari, compiled by Abul Fazl, delineates the geographical boundaries, climate, resources, and administrative units of each subah. Subahs were subdivided into sarkars and parganas, and their economic data (such as assessed revenue, caste composition of zamindars, and military strength) was meticulously recorded. Independent Rajput states were incorporated into the subah framework. For instance:
- Mewar was listed under sarkar Chittor
- Kota under sarkar Ranthambhor
- Jaipur (Amber) under sarkar Ajmer
The size and income of subahs varied:
- Bengal had 24 sarkars with an assessed income of about ₹1.5 crore
- Multan had 3 sarkars with only about ₹37 lakh
Subahdar’s Role:
As the emperor’s viceregent, the subahdar was responsible for the provincial army, law and order, public welfare, and the enforcement of imperial policy. He was to support the diwan in land revenue collection and public works like irrigation, gardens, and rest houses. Criminal justice administration also fell under his jurisdiction, though he was instructed to act with caution regarding capital punishment. He had to remain informed through regular tours and maintain networks of spies and news writers. Significantly, Akbar instructed governors not to interfere with the religious beliefs of the people, underscoring his policy of Sulh-i-Kul (universal tolerance).
The governor’s term was not fixed, and they were frequently transferred to prevent local entrenchment and ensure loyalty to the central authority.
Experimental Reforms and Rajput Integration:
In 1586, Akbar experimented with a dual-governor system to maintain continuity during absences or illnesses. However, it created friction and was soon abandoned. In some provinces, he appointed a Muslim and a Rajput jointly, like in Kabul and Agra, while in others like Ajmer and Lahore, only Rajputs were appointed, which reflects Akbar’s policy of political integration through inclusive appointments.
Role and Duties of Key Provincial Officers
Diwan:
From 1595, diwans were appointed centrally and ceased to be subordinates to the governor. Their responsibilities included:
- Regular reports to the central diwan
- Collection and auditing of land revenue
- Monitoring and curbing extortion by amils (revenue collectors)
- Overseeing charitable land grants
The diwan’s role was crucial for financial governance and agricultural development.
Bakhshi:
The provincial bakhshi, mirroring his central counterpart, managed the military establishment, maintained intelligence networks, and sometimes clashed with governors due to his power to report misconduct to the emperor.
Sadr-cum-Qazi and Mir Adl:
The sadr recommended grants to religious individuals and oversaw the judiciary. Akbar, often dissatisfied with the performance of qazis, appointed a mir adl to assist or supervise them.
Kotwal:
The kotwal maintained law and order in cities and ensured civic amenities such as regulated markets, standardized weights and measures, and the suppression of illegal activities like gambling and prostitution.
Akbar’s provincial administration required collaboration and coordination among various officers, all of whom reported to the emperor or central ministries, making the system dependent on the efficacy of the central authority. Akbar’s personal oversight through spies, tours, and public hearings ensured compliance and curtailed regional separatism.
District and Local Government
Sarkar-Level Administration:
Each province’s sarkars were the next tier of administration, overseen by:
- Faujdar: Chief of general administration, law and order, and road safety. Though he did not handle revenue assessment directly, he supported the revenue officials and commanded local forces. He resembled a British-era collector in function but with added military powers.
- Qazi: Administered criminal justice and resolved civil matters, especially among Muslims or in inter-religious disputes.
Pargana-Level Administration:
Each sarkar was subdivided into parganas, forming the smallest revenue and administrative unit, governed by:
- Shiqdar: Oversaw general administration and policing
- Amil: Responsible for assessment and collection of land revenue
- Treasurer: Managed funds at the pargana level
- Qanungo: Maintained land records and determined boundaries
- Karkuns (clerks): Assisted in maintaining financial and administrative documentation
This structure was hierarchical, with clear distribution of responsibilities, enabling efficient local governance and revenue collection.
The Working of Government: Akbar as the Centre of Power
The emperor was the fulcrum of the entire administrative system. Akbar set a personal example in his approach to governance, which influenced the conduct of the nobility and other officials. His daily routine of three appearances for state business served as both a ritual and an administrative necessity:
- Jharoka Darshan (Morning Appearance):
A unique innovation by Akbar, this was a public event after sunrise where the emperor appeared at a window to offer his darshan (sight) to the public. People could submit petitions directly to him. This built a symbolic link between the ruler and his subjects, reinforcing the idea of divine kingship rooted in Indian traditions. Over time, many even began to fast until they had seen the emperor. - Diwan-i-Aam (Public Audience):
After the darshan, Akbar would retire to the hall of public audience where any individual—noble or commoner—could present their case or petition. Officers returning from campaigns, provincial updates, and administrative matters were also dealt with here. Badayuni noted the vibrancy and energy in these sessions. - Diwan-i-Khas (Private Consultation):
Reserved for confidential matters, this chamber allowed Akbar to deliberate on sensitive political, military, or financial issues with selected ministers and advisors.
Akbar’s personal engagement in daily governance was not merely ceremonial. His continuous monitoring through a network of spies, his commitment to public justice, and his equitable religious policy contributed to administrative stability and the integration of a diverse empire.
The Mansabdari System and the Army
The Mansabdari system, a hallmark of Mughal administration, was devised under Emperor Akbar and served both military and civil functions. The term mansab signified a rank or position, which determined the status, salary, and the number of troops (tabinan) a person was expected to maintain for imperial service. Holders of mansabs could be deployed in administrative posts, military roles, or kept at court, signifying the integration of civil and military functions into a single service. Payment for this service was often made in the form of jagirs, or revenue assignments, rather than cash, granting the right to collect state dues from designated areas.
Mansabs ranged from 10 to 5000 and were notionally divided into sixty-six categories, increasing by tens up to 100 and then by fifties or hundreds. Although these sixty-six ranks were not all in practical use, they indicated a formal gradation. Ranks below 500 were generally termed mansabdars, from 500 to 2500 were called amirs, and above that, amir-i-umda or amir-i-azam.
Initially, progression through ranks was intended to be merit-based, but emperors often granted higher ranks directly, especially to nobles or hereditary rulers. Mansabs over 5000 were typically reserved for princes of royal blood. Exceptionally, Mirza Aziz Koka and Raja Man Singh were promoted to 7000 during Akbar’s reign—a precedent not generally surpassed until the reign of Aurangzeb, when princes were assigned up to 40,000 zat.
Evolution of the Mansabdari System
The numerical framework of the mansabs has its antecedents in Mongol military organization under Chingiz Khan, who grouped his forces into units of 10 to 10,000. However, the systematic gradation of ranks into an integrated hierarchy was Akbar’s innovation, formally implemented in 1567. While Abul Fazl retrospectively attributed mansabs to pre-1567 nobles like Bairam Khan, this likely reflected their stature rather than actual appointments. Importantly, Nizamuddin Ahmad, who managed military records, did not assign ranks to any nobles before this date.
Initially, there was a large discrepancy between the paper strength of mansabdars and their actual military capabilities. To curb this, Akbar introduced the dagh or branding system in 1573–74, requiring physical verification of troops and horses. Badayuni, who held a mansab of 20, described a progression system whereby officials first served in palace or fort duties before expanding their contingent and rising in rank. Promotions were tied to the number of branded troops produced.
The dagh system was deeply unpopular among the nobility. Prominent nobles like Munim Khan and Muzaffar Khan resisted compliance. Mirza Aziz Koka was even punished for non-compliance. The system gave excessive power to junior inspectors, who harassed even senior nobles. Diwans also became overzealous in enforcing dagh, contributing to rebellions in Bengal and Bihar in 1580. Although Akbar tried to mitigate this, abuses persisted.
Despite the dagh, many nobles continued to flout rules by hiring borrowed troops for inspections, dismissing them afterward, and retaining jagir revenues for personal gain.
Dual Rank System: Zat and Sawar
To address such inconsistencies, Akbar introduced the dual-rank system in 1595–96, dividing a mansab into zat and sawar. The zat rank indicated a noble’s personal status and salary, while sawar referred to the number of cavalrymen the noble was obliged to maintain. According to Abul Fazl, mansabdars were divided into three categories: those maintaining sawars equal to their zat (first category), those maintaining half or more (second), and those maintaining less than half (third). For instance, a noble with 4000 zat and 2000 sawars was higher than one with 3000 of each.
The zat rank also determined the number of animals and carts a noble was to maintain. A noble of 5000 zat had to keep 340 horses, 100 elephants, 140 camels, 100 mules, and 160 carts. Quality standards were imposed for horses (Iraqi, Turki, Yabu, Jungla) and elephants. Whether maintenance costs were included in the zat salary or paid separately remains debated, but maintaining a transport corps was crucial for a mobile army.
The branding system extended to all animals, ensuring regular inspections. Abul Fazl emphasized that not only horses but also elephants and baggage animals had to be presented for dagh.
Salaries of Zat and Sawar Ranks
Horse quality and quantity played a crucial role in fixing the salary of a sawar. The ten-twenty (dah-bisti) system required 20 horses for every 10 sawars to ensure mobility. For example, a trooper with an Iraqi horse earned Rs. 30 per month; with a mujannas (mixed breed), Rs. 25; with a Turki horse, Rs. 20; and with a Yabu, Rs. 18. Salaries varied by ethnicity too. Muslims (Mughals, Afghans, Indian Muslims) with three horses earned Rs. 25/month, with two Rs. 20, and with one Rs. 15. Rajputs with three horses earned Rs. 20 and Rs. 15 with two. Although discriminatory, the lower pay for Rajputs encouraged their recruitment by non-Rajput nobles.
On average, historian Moreland estimated a sawar’s annual salary as Rs. 240 before dagh. A mansabdar could deduct 5% of his contingent’s total salary for administrative expenses. The total jagir allocation equaled the zat salary plus the salaries of the sawars based on their ranks.
Zat salaries depended on the category of the noble. For example, a noble of 5000 zat in the first category received Rs. 30,000/month or Rs. 3.6 lakh annually. If he was in the second or third category, he received Rs. 29,000 or Rs. 28,000 respectively. Even lower-ranking nobles, like those with 1000 zat, earned Rs. 8100 or Rs. 8000 depending on their category.
Although sawars were paid separately, the zat salary also rewarded nobles who maintained larger contingents. Nobles were expected to make annual gifts to the Emperor, who sometimes returned more than what was offered. They also bore the administrative cost of revenue collection from their jagirs, which Moreland estimated at no more than 25% of their income.
These salaries, lavish by any standard, attracted capable men from across India and abroad. Badayuni noted that many Arabs and Persians joined the army to secure their fortunes.
The Three Classes of Mansabdars
In 1595-96, the mansabdars were classified into three ,groups :
- a) those with horsemen (sawar) equal to’the number of the zat;
- b) those with horsemen half or more than half of the number of the zat, and
- c) those whose sawar rank was less than half of their zat rank
Number and Role of Mansabdars
Estimating the number of mansabdars under Akbar is challenging. Abul Fazl’s list in the 40th year of Akbar’s reign includes all who served over four decades. Both he and Nizamuddin Ahmad listed only those with 500+ mansabs. Jesuit Du Jarric, writing early in Jahangir’s reign, recorded 2941 mansabdars between 10 and 5000 rank, including 150 (5.1%) with 2500 or above.
These 150 elite mansabdars held the empire’s key civil and military posts. They constituted a hand-picked, professional class whose efficiency and loyalty were essential to Mughal governance. Some scholars argue that cash payment might have offered more control, but Akbar’s choice to grant jagirs was grounded in the socio-political realities of the time.
Revenue collection was complicated due to powerful local zamindars with caste and clan ties to the peasants. Assigning jagirs aligned nobles’ interests with state revenue goals, making them stakeholders in tax collection. Though it risked local exploitation, it was more manageable than direct state control. Even when Akbar brought the region from Lahore to Allahabad under khalisa (direct administration) in 1576, the jagir system was soon reinstated, primarily to gain more accurate data on agricultural productivity.
Du-Aspa Sih-Aspa System
The Du-Aspa Sih-Aspa system was a significant administrative reform introduced during Jahangir’s reign within the Mughal mansabdari system. Literally meaning “two-horse” and “three-horse,” the system allowed a mansabdar to maintain double or triple the number of cavalrymen (sawars) for a given rank and receive enhanced payment accordingly. For example, a mansabdar holding the rank of 2000 zat and 2000 sawar du-aspa sih-aspa would maintain 4000 cavalrymen and be paid as such. This reform allowed the emperor to increase military strength without increasing the zat rank, which signified the personal status of the noble.
Not all sawars under a mansab rank needed to be designated as du-aspa sih-aspa. For instance, in the 2000/2000 example, only 1000 sawars might be under the du-aspa sih-aspa obligation (i.e., 2000 sawars), while the remaining 1000 were barawardi (ordinary), totaling 3000 cavalrymen. This gave flexibility to the imperial administration in managing military resources and personnel.
Later, under Shah Jahan, this measure was linked to a new policy governing how many sawars a mansabdar needed to actually muster based on the location of his jagir (land grant). If the jagir was in the same province as the mansabdar’s posting, he had to muster one-third of his sawar rank; if it was outside, one-fourth. For distant or difficult campaigns such as in Balkh and Badakhshan, the requirement was reduced to one-fifth. A 2000/2000 rank holder (with 1000 du-aspa sih-aspa) whose jagir lay outside his posting province would thus need to provide only 250 ordinary sawars (¼ of 1000) and 500 du-aspa sawars (½ of 1000), totaling 750 effective sawars.
Mahabat Khan was the first mansabdar to be granted the “do aspa sih aspa” rank, which was introduced during Jahangir’s reign. This system allowed mansabdars to maintain a larger quota of troopers than indicated by their sawar rank, effectively doubling the number of troops required.
This was not an entirely new concession. Even during Akbar’s time, reports indicate that mansabdars rarely mustered their full quota of troops. Shah Jahan merely systematized this under a formal framework.
While this seemed like a major concession to nobles—since they were still paid largely for the full sawar rank—it came with adjustments. Mansabdars’ salaries were now determined by a monthly scale depending on the actual revenue (hasil) of their jagir compared to its assessed value (jama). Jagirs were categorized as ten-monthly (10/12), eight-monthly (8/12), etc. Most nobles received jagirs yielding 8 to 4 months of income, while only the highest-ranking princes received 10-monthly jagirs. In the Deccan, where the jama was often inflated, jagirs were sometimes as low as three-monthly.
Salaries for sawars were also adjusted. In a 12-monthly jagir, a sawar earned Rs. 40/month, but only Rs. 30 in an 8-monthly jagir, and Rs. 25 in a 6-monthly one. The number of horses per sawar also declined with lower month scales, ending Akbar’s earlier ten-twenty system.
From 1595 to 1656, the empire’s total revenue (jama) rose from Rs. 12.91 crores to Rs. 22.80 crores, but the number of mansabdars and their ranks grew at a faster rate. To manage this imbalance, salaries and military obligations were reduced. This cost-cutting, however, weakened actual military presence—especially problematic in unstable regions like the Deccan, where Maratha insurgency later exposed these weaknesses. Thus, these reforms reflected the emerging crisis in the Jagirdari system, which became severe during Aurangzeb’s reign.
The Mughal Army under Akbar
The Mughal army during Akbar’s reign was composed of five main components: cavalry, infantry, artillery, elephants, and camels. Although it lacked a modern navy, a flotilla of boats operated under the amir-ul-bahr (Admiral or Lord of the Sea).
There are common misconceptions about the Mughal army’s effectiveness. Its successes were not due to luck alone, but rather to competent leadership, high morale, and a strategic blend of cavalry, artillery, and elephants, with infantry playing a supportive role. Monserrate, a Jesuit observer, called the cavalry “the flower of the army,” emphasizing its importance and quality. The Mughal state prioritized maintaining a strong and well-equipped cavalry, largely through the dagh (branding) system for horse verification.
Akbar sourced high-quality horses from Iraq, Iran, and Arabia. Cavalrymen were protected with iron helmets and armor, and their horses had protective gear on the neck, chest, and back. The sawars (cavalrymen) carried swords, lances, and bows. However, the burden of equipping the cavalrymen lay on the soldiers themselves—they had to purchase their own horses and present them at musters for inspection before receiving pay. This practice often led to harassment and corruption.
To offset the initial burden, newly appointed mansabdars were given barawardi, an ad hoc payment to help equip their contingent. But this became a source of corruption as some nobles delayed musters, kept nominal forces, and drew salaries for full contingents. Some troops were directly recruited and paid by the state and assigned to senior mansabdars; these were known as dakhili troopers.
There was also a separate elite category of cavalrymen called ahadis or gentleman troopers. They owned at least five horses, were well paid, and had their own diwan (muster-master). They could be deployed across the army or serve as messengers, and sometimes were appointed alongside mansabdars.
Artillery in India had advanced considerably since Babur’s time. The Mughal arsenal included both siege and fort guns. Siege guns, though large and prestigious, were cumbersome and difficult to transport, requiring elephants and thousands of bullocks. Their use in battle was limited due to slow firing and low mobility, and their effectiveness during sieges—like that of Chittor—was debatable. Consequently, mining under fort walls with gunpowder became an alternative strategy.
Lighter artillery was more practical and came in several forms:
- Narnal – carried on men’s backs,
- Gajal – on elephants,
- Shutrnal – on camels.
These were swivel guns used for quicker, flexible firing. Camels were trained to kneel while firing the guns mounted on them.
Field guns (arrabas) on wheeled carriages, likely used at Panipat and Khanua, may have predated Akbar’s reign. Akbar focused on improving artillery by inventing portable, reassembling guns and refining gun-carriages. One innovation allowed 17 guns to be fired in succession with a single match, likely due to the sequential ignition from residual heat. Akbar also promoted the manufacture of hand-muskets (matchlocks), which varied from three feet to two yards in length. Devices were developed for boring and cleaning gun barrels with machines drawn by oxen.
Thousands of elephants were employed in warfare, carefully graded and equipped. Besides transporting war materials and nobles, elephants were used in coordination with cavalry as battering rams or mobile shields. However, they were vulnerable when isolated and surrounded by enemy cavalry.
The infantry was vast and included both combatant and non-combatant groups. The primary fighting unit consisted of banduqchis or matchlock-men. This corps had its own administrative hierarchy—clerks, treasurers, and officers—and was divided into salary classes ranging from 110 to 300 dams monthly. Most dakhili troops assigned to mansabdars were infantry and matchlock-men.
Roughly one-fourth of the army’s personnel were non-combatants: carpenters, blacksmiths, water carriers, pioneers, etc., essential for logistical support. Others like messengers, palki-bearers, wrestlers, and slaves formed auxiliary services necessary for operational efficiency. Often, these support personnel were mistaken for combat troops, leading to inflated estimates of the army’s strength.
Additionally, the emperor maintained palace guards and a network of spies for internal security and intelligence.
As for the numerical strength of the army, Monserrate wrote in 1581 that there were 45,000 cavalry, 5,000 elephants, and thousands of infantry on the royal payroll. However, the actual strength of cavalry maintained by mansabdars is difficult to determine, especially in the early phase when the mansab rank didn’t specify the number of sawars. After the introduction of the sawar rank, some numbers are available, but not comprehensively. Nonetheless, the combined cavalry—imperial and noble—likely exceeded 100,000. Reliable figures for infantry and artillery are unavailable.
Jagirdari System
The Jagir system under the Mughals was an evolved form of the earlier Delhi Sultanate’s iqta system, wherein revenue assignments were granted to nobles (iqtadars) in return for military and administrative services. The Mughals adopted and expanded this model by assigning revenue (not land) from specific areas to their nobles, who were called jagirdars, in lieu of cash salaries. These assignments helped the state extract surplus from the peasantry and distribute it among the ruling elite.
Although terms like iqta, iqtadar, and tuyul/tuyuldar were used, jagir and jagirdar became the dominant terms during the Mughal period. The system was refined significantly during Akbar’s reign, though it went through various changes before stabilizing.
Early Phase of the Jagir System
After his conquests, Babur restored lands to former Afghan chieftains or granted them assignments known as wajh (remuneration), and their holders were called wajhdars. A fixed sum from the total revenue of a region was assigned to the wajhdars, and the remaining revenue belonged to the khalisa (crown lands). In areas not restored, Babur appointed hakims or governors. Humayun likely continued this pattern.
Organisation under Akbar
Under Akbar, all territory was divided into khalisa (directly controlled by the imperial treasury) and jagir (assigned to mansabdars). The jagir system became central to Mughal administration. Some nobles received cash (naqdi) salaries, while others received jagirs. A few received both. The estimated revenue from jagir lands was called jama (or jamadami), and was calculated in dams, a copper coin worth about 1/40th of a silver rupaya.
Jama included land revenue, sair jihat (customs, inland transit duties, port taxes, etc.), and other taxes. Hasil referred to the actual revenue collected. Unassigned areas were known as paibaqi.
By the 31st year of Akbar’s reign, the khalisa revenue in provinces like Delhi, Awadh, and Allahabad amounted to less than 5% of the total. Under Jahangir, nearly 90% of territory was under jagir, leaving just 10% for the khalisa. Under Shah Jahan, the ratio fluctuated; initially one-eleventh, and by the 20th year, nearly one-seventh was khalisa. In Aurangzeb’s 10th year, khalisa accounted for one-fifth, but this declined as more mansabdars required assignments.
Transfer of Jagirdars
Jagirdars were frequently transferred from one jagir to another to prevent them from establishing local roots. While this checked their consolidation of power, it also discouraged long-term developmental initiatives. Many jagirdars focused solely on maximizing short-term revenue extraction.
Types of Jagirs
The system included four main types of jagirs:
- Jagir Tankha: Granted in lieu of salary; transferable every 3–4 years.
- Mashrut Jagir: Conditional jagirs granted for specific services or terms.
- Waqf Jagir: Non-service-based grants, usually given for religious or charitable purposes.
- Watan Jagir: Hereditary, non-transferable grants given to zamindars in their native areas.
Additionally, under Jahangir, a type called al-tamgha resembled watan jagirs but was given to Muslim nobles.
Sometimes, a zamindar or chieftain was also appointed a mansabdar. If his watan jagir did not meet his rank’s salary requirement, he was granted an additional tankha jagir elsewhere. For instance, Jaswant Singh of Marwar, who held a watan jagir in Jodhpur, also received a tankha jagir in Hissar.
Sources To Study The Mughal Administration
- Mughal Administration – Jadunath Sarkar
- Satish Chandra: MEDIEVAL INDIA FROM SULTANAT TO THE MUGHALS PART TWO MUGHAL EMPIRE (1526-1748)
- The Agrarian System of Mughal India, 1556-1707 Book by Irfan Habib
- 📘 Foundational and Comprehensive Texts:
- “The Mughal Empire” by J.F. Richards
- Part of The New Cambridge History of India.
- Offers a balanced political and administrative history of the Mughal Empire, including revenue, military, and provincial structures.
- “Mughal Administration” by Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi
- A classic and focused study on the administrative machinery of the Mughal Empire, particularly during Akbar’s reign.
- “Akbar and His Times” by S.R. Sharma
- Good for understanding Akbar’s administrative innovations like the mansabdari and revenue reforms.
- “History of the Mughal Empire” by R.P. Tripathi
- Detailed and narrative-driven; includes a strong focus on political institutions and governance practices.
- “The Agrarian System of Mughal India” by Irfan Habib
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