Explore the 1646-47 The Balkh Campaign of Shah Jahan—was it a strategic move to secure the empire’s frontiers or an ambitious attempt to revive Timurid legacy in Central Asia? A detailed historical analysis of political intent and military action.
Based On the Medieval India: From Sultanate To The Mughals Mughal Empire (1526-1748) Part Two
by Satish Chandra
The Balkh campaign of 1646, led by the Mughal emperor Shah Jahan, holds a unique place in Mughal history. While some view it as the peak of Mughal foreign policy, showcasing ambition beyond the Indian subcontinent, others consider its failure the beginning of Mughal military decline. To fully understand this campaign, it is essential to view it within the broader framework of Mughal interactions with Central Asia (Turan) following the death of Abdullah Khan Uzbek in 1598, and the Mughal Empire’s broader foreign strategy.
Table of Contents
Political Dynamism in Central Asia
After Abdullah Khan’s death in 1598, the Uzbek khanate experienced political instability. In 1611, Imam Quli from a different branch of the Uzbek ruling family took control of Balkh and Bukhara. In a move he later regretted, Imam Quli granted Balkh and Badakhshan to his younger brother, Nazr Muhammad, while retaining Bukhara himself. Over time, Nazr Muhammad acted as an independent ruler. This division worked in favour of the Mughals, as a united Uzbek Khanate would have been more threatening.
During this period, diplomatic ties between the Uzbeks and the Mughals remained minimal, although Mughal relations with the Safavids of Persia were friendly. Jahangir made no significant effort to reclaim the ancestral lands of the Timurids, even though the goal of returning to Central Asia was often declared by earlier rulers.
Diplomatic Shifts and Growing Tensions
As Safavid power expanded, the Uzbeks grew wary of Persian intentions. In 1621, Imam Quli’s mother sent an embassy to Nur Jahan with goodwill messages and Central Asian gifts. Nur Jahan responded with her own embassy, which led to the exchange of diplomats between Imam Quli and Jahangir.
Following the Persian capture of Qandahar in 1622 and growing unrest within the Mughal Empire—caused by Shah Jahan’s rebellion and Jahangir’s declining health—the Uzbeks altered their approach. Imam Quli sought to strengthen ties with the Persian ruler, while Nazr Muhammad made an attempt to seize Kabul. His general, Yalingtosh, launched an assault on the city but was repelled by the Mughals, who had the advantage of stronger artillery. Yalingtosh also tried to stir uprisings among the Hazaras and Afghans and advanced towards Ghazni, but both efforts ended in failure.
Soon, Imam Quli sent messages of friendship to the Mughals, possibly to cover up Yalingtosh’s aggression. He even proposed a joint Mughal-Uzbek campaign against Persia to divide Khurasan, though it appeared more symbolic than genuine. Jahangir, in any case, did not act on the proposal, and he passed away shortly after.
Renewed Uzbek Aggression and Mughal Response
In 1628, soon after Jahangir’s death, Nazr Muhammad attacked Kabul again, this time successfully occupying the city and laying siege to its fort. However, Mughal reinforcements arrived swiftly, forcing Nazr Muhammad to flee. In response, the Mughals captured Bamiyan and sent a diplomatic mission to Imam Quli to reaffirm friendly relations, further isolating Nazr Muhammad.
Although Imam Quli maintained good relations with Shah Jahan, Nazr Muhammad only sent his congratulations for Shah Jahan’s accession in 1633. Over the next six years, there were regular exchanges between the two courts, and the old idea of a Sunni alliance—Mughal, Uzbek, and Ottoman—against the Shi’a Safavids was revived. But Shah Jahan remained cautious and continued his pro-Iranian policy. Acting independently, he recovered Qandahar in 1638 by securing the defection of Murshid Quli Khan, a skilled general and engineer.
In 1639, Imam Quli turned blind, and Nazr Muhammad seized the opportunity to reunite the Uzbek Khanate under his rule. Imam Quli was forced to flee to Iran and later went on a pilgrimage to Mecca. As ruler of the unified Uzbek state, Nazr Muhammad governed strictly, cancelling many tax-free land grants and launching campaigns like the one in Khwarizm. However, a rebellion erupted in Tashkent. His son Abdul Aziz, sent to crush the rebellion, joined it instead and declared himself ruler in Bukhara.
Balkh Campaign of Shah Jahan: Shah Jahan’s Intervention
Losing control over Bukhara, Nazr Muhammad retreated to Balkh, his final stronghold. In 1645, he appealed to Shah Jahan for military assistance. Shah Jahan eagerly accepted the offer. Moving from Lahore to Kabul, he dispatched a powerful army under Prince Murad. The force included 50,000 cavalry, 10,000 infantry (including musketeers, rocketeers, and gunners), and a Rajput contingent. The army left Kabul in mid-1646.
Shah Jahan directed Prince Murad to show due respect to Nazr Muhammad and to hand back control of Balkh, provided he demonstrated loyalty and submission. He even told Murad to support any effort by Nazr Muhammad to recover Bukhara and Samarqand. Clearly, Shah Jahan wanted to install a friendly ruler in the region who would align with Mughal interests.
Unfortunately, Prince Murad’s impatience derailed the plan. Without waiting for Nazr Muhammad’s approval, Murad marched into Balkh, ordered his troops to enter the fort where Nazr Muhammad resided, and demanded that he appear before him. Fearing Murad’s intentions, Nazr Muhammad fled. As a result, the Mughals had to occupy Balkh themselves, dealing with a hostile and resentful population. Meanwhile, Abdul Aziz, commanding an army of 120,000, rallied support in Transoxiana and prepared to challenge the Mughals.
Murad, longing to return home, requested to leave Balkh. According to historian Lahori, many Mughal nobles supported this due to homesickness, dislike for Balkh’s customs and climate, and the unfamiliar lifestyle. Furious, Shah Jahan punished Murad by stripping him of his mansab and jagir in Multan. To restore order, the Mughal Wazir, Sadullah Khan, was sent to Balkh, but he could not change the nobles’ attitudes. Eventually, Shah Jahan appointed Prince Aurangzeb and Ali Mardan Khan to take charge of the campaign.
Aurangzeb’s Victory and Strategic Withdrawal
Aurangzeb avoided crossing the Oxus River but placed strong defenses at critical points, keeping the main army and artillery ready to move quickly. When Abdul Aziz crossed the Oxus to attack Balkh, he was confronted by Mughal forces in a fierce battle outside the city. The Mughal artillery proved decisive, and the Uzbek army scattered.
This victory gave Shah Jahan a window to advance further into Samarqand and Bukhara. He had earlier written to Shah Abbas II of Persia, calling the Balkh victory a first step towards capturing those cities. Shah Jahan also promised to make Murad viceroy of Bukhara and Samarqand to encourage him to stay.
However, practical challenges soon forced a change in plans. The unfriendly local population, the difficulty of maintaining supply lines, and the reluctance of Mughal nobles to remain in Balkh forced Shah Jahan to abandon expansionist goals. Abdul Aziz and Nazr Muhammad each tried to reclaim control over Balkh. After much thought, Shah Jahan leaned towards restoring Nazr Muhammad. However, Nazr Muhammad was asked to first make a personal apology to Aurangzeb—an unacceptable demand for the proud Uzbek ruler. Knowing the Mughals could not hold Balkh much longer, he chose not to respond.
As winter neared and resources were exhausted, the Mughals retreated from Balkh in October 1647. Although they faced harassment from Uzbek raiders during the retreat and suffered heavy losses, Aurangzeb’s steady leadership prevented total disaster.
Conclusion: Between Victory and Overreach
The Balkh expedition has been a subject of significant discussion and differing interpretations among historians. While some Mughal chroniclers justified it as necessary to protect Kabul and punish Nazr Muhammad, modern historians are more critical. Scholar Riazul Islam argues that the campaign was driven by Shah Jahan’s unrealistic obsession with reviving the lost Timurid empire in Central Asia.
But a deeper look reveals a more practical motive. Shah Jahan’s primary objective was to safeguard the Kabul-Qandahar region against the potential danger posed by a unified Uzbek power. Supporting Nazr Muhammad against his rebellious son was a strategy to keep the Uzbeks divided. The Mughals also hoped to secure Badakhshan—an unimportant but useful territory. Despite early military success, the costs of maintaining control over Balkh became clear.
In military terms, the Mughals won: they occupied Balkh and defeated Uzbek forces. It was a rare example of Indian forces achieving victory in Central Asia. Yet, politically and logistically, the campaign revealed the limits of Mughal power beyond their natural frontiers. Holding on to Balkh was beyond their capacity, especially with Persian hostility and an unfriendly population.
Still, the campaign wasn’t a total failure. By helping deepen divisions within the Uzbek leadership, it secured the north-western frontier of India. No foreign invasion came for nearly a century—until Nadir Shah’s invasion in the 18th century. In that sense, the Balkh campaign, though short-lived, fulfilled its strategic purpose.
Further Readings: North West Frontier and Shahjahan By Syed Ali Nadeem Rezavi
